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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff Irving Braun's appeal because, as
explained further in Part I of the argument below, this appeal suffers from two
fundamental procedural and jurisdictional defects.
First, Braun does not challenge the order from which he is appealing. Braun
states in his Notice of Appeal that he is appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order
dismissing his amended derivative complaint for lack of standing.

(Appellant's

Docketing Statement at p. 2) Yet, Braun makes clear in his opening brief that he is not
challenging the trial court's conclusion in the May 11, 2009 order that he lacked standing
to assert his purported derivative claims. In short, Braun does not contend that the trial
court erred in entering the May 11, 2009 order from which he purports to appeal. This
alone compels dismissal of this appeal or affirmance of the trial court's order.
The second defect in this appeal is that Braun is not appealing any formal ruling
by the trial court at all. Rather, Braun is attempting to appeal from, and challenge,
preliminary oral remarks made by the trial court at the October 15, 2008 hearing on
defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Braun's initial complaint, which
purported to assert "direct" (as opposed to "derivative") claims against defendants, and
which Braun voluntarily withdrew before filing his amended derivative complaint.
Indeed, the thrust of Braun's appeal is that "the trial court erred in concluding that
plaintiffs claims are derivative rather than direct" when it made those remarks, even
though the court's informal comments were never the basis of any ruling or order. {See,
e.g., Appellant's Br. at 15-24)

As explained further below, Braun's attempt to challenge the trial court's
October 15, 2008 oral comments is improper. As an initial matter, the trial court never
"concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative; to the contrary, it made clear to the
parties that its comments were preliminary and that it could change its mind. But even if
the trial court did "conclude" that Braun's claims were derivative, which it did not, oral
remarks such as the ones Braun is attempting to challenge here are simply not appealable.
Finally, and more fundamentally, Braun is attempting in this appeal to resurrect the direct
claims that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court. Having withdrawn those claims
voluntarily below, however, Braun has no right to challenge their purported "dismissal"
in this appeal.
For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this appeal, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear it, and the appeal should be dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues for review:
1.

Is there a proper jurisdictional or legal basis for this appeal where, as here,

plaintiff Braun does not challenge the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing — the order from which he purports to
appeal?
2.

Is there a proper jurisdictional or legal basis for this appeal where, as here,

Braun is attempting to challenge preliminary and informal oral remarks made by the trial
court, and to resurrect claims that he voluntarily withdrew in favor of his amended
derivative complaint?
3.

Did the district court err in holding in the alternative that Braun's exclusive

remedy was a statutory appraisal proceeding where, as here, his challenge to the Buyout
Group's October 22, 2008 acquisition of Nevada Chemicals, Inc. boiled down to nothing
more than a complaint about the adequacy of the purchase price?
4.

Even if he had not withdrawn them, does Braun properly characterize the

claims asserted in his initial complaint as direct (as opposed to derivative) under Utah law
where, as here, he does not and cannot allege that he was injured in a manner distinct
from other shareholders of NCEM?
These are questions of law reviewed for correctness. Citizens for Responsible
Transp. v. Draper City, 2008 UT 43, % 8, 190 P.3d 1245.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of the so-called "Buyout Group" defendants'1 acquisition of
nominal defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc. ("NCEM" or the "Company").
On September 5, 2008, NCEM announced that it had signed an agreement to be
acquired by the Buyout Group, via a tender offer, for $13.37 per share. (R.50) Plaintiff
Irving Braun, a serial plaintiff,2 commenced this action just one week later, on
September 12, 2008, before NCEM had filed or was even required to file with the SEC
disclosure forms relating to the transaction.

(R.l-13)

Braun alleged that NCEM's

directors3 breached their fiduciary duties to NCEM by failing to negotiate an adequate
purchase price and by failing to disclose material information about the transaction. (Id.)

1 The Buyout Group defendants are Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso
Acquisition Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund
IV, L.P.
2 Braun has been a plaintiff in at least ten shareholder lawsuits. (R.799); see also
Braun v. Knight Trading Group., et al, 2:00-cv-06247 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2000); Braun
v. Razorfish, Inc. et al, l:01-cv-00427 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2001); Braun v.
Autoweb.com, Inc. et al, l:01-cv-04120 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001); Braun v. Andrx
Corp., et al, 0:02-cv-60496 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2002); Braun et al. v. Vaxgen, Inc. et
al, 3:03-cv-01264 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2003); Sekuk Global, et al. v. KVH Indust,
Inc., et al, l:04-cv-00306 (D.C.R.I. Jul. 21, 2004); Braun v. Alvarion, Ltd., et al,
l:07-cv-02096 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007); Stern v. Bank of N.Y., 7:94-cv-03473
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1994); Tabak v. Mobile Oil Credit Corp., 7:97-cv-06349
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1997); Braun v. GT Solar International, Inc., et al, l:08-cv00312 (D.N.H. Aug. 1, 2008); In re IPO Securities Litig., et al, l:21-mc-00092
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2001); Irving S. Braun v. Nevada Chemicals Inc. et al, 080919636
(Utah 3rd Dist. Ct. Sep. 12, 2008).
3 The NCEM director defendants are E. Bryan Bagley, Nathan L. Wade, John T. Day,
James E. Solomon, and M. Garfield Cook.
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Braun alleged further that the Buyout Group defendants had "aided and abetted" the
directors' alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.

(R.9 at ffif 37-45)

Based on these

allegations, Braun purported to assert various "direct" (as opposed to "derivative") claims
for breach of duty against defendants, and sought to enjoin the Buyout Group's
acquisition of NCEM. (R.12)
On September 20, 2008, NCEM moved to dismiss Braun's initial complaint on the
ground that Braun was attempting to assert derivative claims belonging to NCEM (as
opposed to direct claims belonging to plaintiff personally), and that Braun had failed to
satisfy any of the conditions precedent for asserting derivative claims. (R. 114-26) In
response, Braun argued that his direct claims were proper but, if they were not, he should
be granted leave to file an amended derivative complaint on behalf of the corporation.
(R.507-21)
On October 7, 2008, the trial court conducted a telephonic conference with
counsel for the respective parties.

(R.423-24)

At that time, the court scheduled a

preliminary injunction hearing for October 15, 2008. (Id.) The court also scheduled oral
argument on NCEM's motion to dismiss for that same date. (Id.)
On October 15, 2008, two days before the Buyout Group's tender offer for
NCEM's shares was set to expire, Braun's counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing and
announced (1) that Braun had not appeared for the hearing, and (2) that Braun was
voluntarily withdrawing his motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition.
(R.1167 at pp. 2, 10, 21) Braun also withdrew his initial complaint and sought and

5

obtained leave from the trial court to file his amended derivative complaint. (R.1167 at
p. 19-20)
The Buyout Group's tender offer ended two days later, on October 17, 2008, with
holders of more than 90% of NCEM's common stock tendering their shares. (R.1069)
The Buyout Group paid for and acquired those tendered shares on October 22, 2008 and,
that same day, acquired NCEM's remaining shares through a "short form" merger that
did not require a shareholder vote. (Id.) Upon consummation of that short-form merger,
Braun ceased being a shareholder of NCEM.
Braun filed his amended derivative complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same
day the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM. (R.949) Braun's amended
derivative complaint echoed the allegations in his original complaint and sought to enjoin
the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM, or to rescind the transaction in the event the
acquisition had already occurred.

(R.967-68)

Of course, it had already occurred.

(R.1069)
The defendants then moved to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint on
the ground that, because he was no longer a shareholder of the Company, Braun lacked
standing to assert his derivative claims. (R.1099, 989) On May 11, 2009, the trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint.
(R. 1148-50) The trial court agreed with the defendants that, because Braun was no
longer a shareholder of NCEM, he lacked standing to bring his derivative claims.
(R.1149) The trial court also held in the alternative that, because Braun's complaint
boiled down only to a claim that the Buyout Group's tender offer price was too low, his
6

exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of his shares pursuant
to Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act. (Id.)
This is Braun's appeal from the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing. (Appellant's Br. at 14)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows.
I.

The Announcement Of The Buyout Group's Agreement To Acquire NCEM.
On September 5, 2008, NCEM announced that it had signed an agreement to be

acquired by the Buyout Group, via a tender offer, for $13.37 per share. (R.118, 50)
NCEM also announced that additional details regarding the tender offer and the
transaction would be disclosed in tender offer documents that would be filed with the
SEC concurrently with the commencement of the Buyout Group's tender offer. (R.49 et
seq.)
NCEM's announcement marked the end of a lengthy auction process conducted by
NCEM's board of directors, who had no future monetary or employment interests in
NCEM and, like NCEM's public shareholders, every incentive to get the highest possible
price for their NCEM shares. (R.63, 799-812) NCEM's board did just that. The Buyout
Group's offer of $13.37 per share beat NCEM's next best offer by more than a dollar per
share, and it provided NCEM's shareholders with a 36% premium over the closing
market price of NCEM's stock on the date of the announcement — a remarkable
achievement given the deteriorating equity markets at the time. (R.118, 57-59, 800) For
these and other reasons, a disinterested financial analyst who reviewed the transaction
concluded not only that the price was fair, but that it was at the upper end of the range of
fairness. (R.76-77)
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II.

Rraun's Initial Complaint And Motion For A Preliminary Injunction.
Braun, a professional plaintiff who owned a mere .0028% of NCEM's outstanding

common stock, commenced this action just one week later, on September 12, 2008. (R.l,
13) In true strike-suit fashion, Braun did so before the defendants filed their tender offer
documents with the SEC, and before the Buyout Group commenced its tender offer for
NCEM shares on September 19, 2008. (R.952 at \ 5; R.963 at If 53) Not afraid to shoot
first and ask questions later, Braun alleged in his initial complaint that NCEM's directors
breached their fiduciary duties to NCEM by failing to negotiate an adequate purchase
price, and by failing to disclose material information about the transaction in NCEM's
yet-to-be-filed SEC Form 14D-9. (R.2 at \ 1; R.9-12) Not content to stop there, Plaintiff
alleged further that the Buyout Group defendants had "aided and abetted" the directors'
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, presumably by engaging in arm's-length negotiations
with NCEM's representatives with respect to the offer price. (R.10 atffif37, 40; R.11 at
If 43)

Based on these allegations, Braun purported to assert, on behalf of a class

consisting of all of NCEM's shareholders, various "direct" (as opposed to "derivative")
claims for breach of duty against defendants, and sought to enjoin the Buyout Group's
acquisition of NCEM (R.2 at \ 1; R.l2), although he did not simultaneously move for a
preliminary injunction.
The defendants moved to dismiss Braun's initial complaint. (R.l 14-26) In its
September 30, 2008 motion, NCEM argued inter alia that, under Utah law, Braun was
attempting to assert derivative claims that belonged to NCEM (as opposed to direct
claims that belonged to Braun personally), and that Braun had failed to satisfy any of the
9

conditions precedent and unique pleading requirements applicable to such derivative
claims under Utah law. (R.122-24)4
Two days later (and three weeks after he filed his initial complaint), on October 2,
2008, Braun filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to block the Buyout Group's
acquisition of NCEM. (R. 180) Braun argued in support of this motion that he would
suffer irreparable injury if the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM, since it
would be impractical to try to unwind the acquisition after it occurred. (R.207-08) By
October 2, 2008, the Buyout Group's tender offer was already more than two weeks old,
and the tender offer was scheduled to expire on October 17, 2008. (R.78) Thus, Braun
requested an expedited hearing on his motion for a preliminary injunction. (R.181) The
trial court granted Braun's request; it set his motion for an evidentiary hearing on
October 15, 2008. (R.423)

4 Utah law requires plaintiffs to satisfy several conditions precedent and to meet unique
pleading requirements in order to maintain a derivative action. For example, plaintiffs
must submit a written demand that the board of directors take suitable action and then
wait ninety days before filing suit in order to give the board adequate time to
determine whether to pursue the requested remedies. Utah Code Aim. § 16-10a740(3)(a)(i). In addition, Utah R. Civ. P. 23A and section 16-10a-740 of the Utah
Code require that a derivative complaint be verified and contain averments that the
complaint seeks to enforce a "right that the corporation . . . could have enforced and
did not," and that "the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on the court
that it would not otherwise have." Utah R. Civ. P 23A(a). Plaintiffs must also state
"with particularity, the plaintiffs efforts, if any, to obtain the desired action," id. at R.
23A(a)(4); see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)(b)(ii), and plaintiffs must also
demonstrate that they "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders
. . . similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation," Utah R. Civ. P.
23A(b); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(2)(b). Braun failed to comply with any of
these requirements.
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Meanwhile, Braun hedged his bets. Undoubtedly in response to NCEM's motion
to dismiss his initial complaint, Braun began preparing to file a derivative complaint,
even as he pressed forward with his direct claims. Thus, Braun executed the necessary
"verification" required by Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(a) on October 6, 2008. (R.971) A few
days later, on October 10, 2008, Braun submitted to NCEM's board of directors the
written demand required by Utah Code Section 16-10a-740(3)(a)(i). (R.541-44) After
completing these steps, Braun filed his response to NCEM's motion to dismiss the initial
complaint.

(R.507) Braun argued in his response that the initial complaint's direct

claims against defendants were proper. (R.511-16) However, Braun also argued in the
alternative that, in the event the trial court disagreed, he should be granted leave to file an
amended derivative complaint on behalf of the corporation. (R.516-19, 546-47)
Consistent with this latter argument, Braun attached to his response to NCEM's motion to
dismiss a motion for leave to file an amended derivative complaint. (R.546)
IIL

Braun's Decisions To Withdraw His Motion For A Preliminary Injunction,
To Withdraw His Initial Complaint, And To File His Amended Derivative
Complaint.
On October 15, 2008, two days before the Buyout Group's tender offer for

NCEM's shares was set to expire, the trial court held a hearing on Braun's motion for a
preliminary injunction and on NCEM's motion to dismiss the initial complaint. (R.1167)
At the outset of this hearing, Braun withdrew his motion for a preliminary injunction
without calling any witnesses or submitting any evidence. (See R.939; R.973-74; R.l 167
at pp. 2, 21)
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The trial court then turned to NCEM's motion to dismiss and shared with counsel
its preliminary thoughts on the motion:
THE COURT: Well, let me - could I give you sort of my take on this that I
was thinking about before you all came this morning? I mean - and
admittedly, I've not heard arguments on any of the substantive issues, but
this is where my thinking is going after I read everything yesterday. I think
number one, that the Motion to Dismiss is well taken. I think that the
claim, if it's going to be brought, must be brought as a derivative action.
So if I were to hear argument, and unless someone changed my mind for
me this morning, which certainly could happen, I would be inclined to
grant the Motion to Dismiss.. . .
. . . and I'm sure the plaintiff wants to respond to what Fve said as well.
That9s just kind of my preliminary thinking.
(R.l 167 at pp. 12, 14) (emphasis added).
Following these remarks from the court, counsel for the parties excused
themselves to discuss whether it would be necessary to argue NCEM's motion to dismiss,
or whether plaintiff would simply go ahead and file his amended derivative complaint.
(R.l 167 at p. 14) Upon their return, counsel for NCEM informed the trial court that the
parties had agreed that plaintiff would simply go ahead and do the latter. {Id.)
Inexplicably, Braun's counsel then began to argue the merits of his initial
complaint. (R. 1167 at pp. 15-16) This prompted the trial court to interject with the
following comment:
Well, but wait. But before we start to argue that issue . . .I'm still not quite
understanding. Do you not want to file the amended complaint? . . If you
want to file the amended complaint, I'm not sure why we need to hear the
Motion to Dismiss.
(R. 1167 at pp. 16,17)
The following exchange ensued:
12

[BRAUN'S COUNSEL]: Well, I would appreciate the opportunity to
explain quickly why we think that the claims are [direct], but if the Court is
telling us that there's no way you're going to change your mind, then —
THE COURT: I'm not telling you that. I would never do that. But let me
hear -1 think [counsel for NCEM] has been standing up a couple of times.
[NCEM'S COUNSEL]: I'm sorry. I just want to say that if he wants to go
forward with the Motion to Dismiss, we have tried to expedite this process
by stipulating to it. If he wants to go forward with arguing the Motion to
Dismiss, we withdraw our stipulation, and we'll just go through the normal
course of litigation . . .
(R. 1167 at pp. 17, 18) (emphasis added).
The Court then asked Braun's counsel, "What do you want to do?" (R.1167 at
p. 19) Braun's counsel responded, "we'll enter the stipulation to file an amended
complaint...."

(Id.) (emphasis added). Accordingly, on October 23, 2008, the trial court

entered a stipulated order, signed by counsel for all of the parties, including Braun,
granting plaintiff leave to file his amended derivative complaint. (R.972-74; see also
R.939)
IV.

The Completion Of The Buyout Group's Acquisition Of NCEM.
The Buyout Group's tender offer ended on October 17, 2008. (R.952 at ^ 5) As

noted above, holders of more than 90% of NCEM's common shares accepted the Buyout
Group's tender offer (R.1007 at ^|2), undoubtedly because the offer price represented a
36% premium over the market price of the stock immediately before the tender offer,
(R.70). The Buyout Group paid for and acquired the tendered shares on October 22,
2008 and, that same day, acquired NCEM's remaining shares through a "short form"
merger that did not require a shareholder vote. (R.1007, 1016-17, 1021-23)
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Notably, upon consummation of that short-form merger, Braun ceased being a
shareholder of NCEM. (R. 1022-25) At that point, Braun retained only the right to
receive the "Merger Consideration" of $13.37 per share or, alternatively, to receive
payment of the appraised value of his shares in the event he exercised his dissenter's
rights to an appraisal under Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1301, -1302, -1328; See also

R. 1024-25.
V.

Braun's Amended Derivative Complaint
Braun filed his amended derivative complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same

day the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM. (See R.949; R. 1007-08)
Remarkably, Braun's amended complaint did not reflect completion of the tender offer or
the consummation of the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM, let alone its impact on
Braun's status as an NCEM shareholder and on his allegations and claims for relief.
R.949-68) Instead, Braun's amended derivative complaint simply echoed the allegations
in his original complaint and, based on these allegations, sought to enjoin the Buyout
Group's acquisition of NCEM, or to rescind the transaction in the event it had already
occurred. (Id.) Again, it had already occurred.
VI.

The District Court's Dismissal Of Braun's Amended Derivative Complaint.
The defendants then moved to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint on

the ground that, because he was no longer a shareholder of the Company, Braun lacked
standing to bring a derivative claim. (R.996-98) Rule 23A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, like Rule 23.1(a) of the Federal Rules, expressly provides that a "derivative
14

action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the
right of the corporation." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(a). The
courts have construed these rules to require derivative plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
owned stock in the corporation both at the time of the transaction and "throughout the
pendency of the suit, which includes the bringing of the suit and its prosecution." Lewis
v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).

Because Braun was no longer a

shareholder of NCEM as of the day he filed his amended derivative complaint, he failed
to meet this threshold requirement for bringing a derivative action, and he therefore
lacked standing to represent the corporation in a suit against its former board of directors
and the Buyout Group. (R.996-98)
On May 11, 2009, the trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss Braun's
amended derivative complaint. (R.l 148-50) The trial court agreed with the defendants
that, because Braun was no longer a shareholder of NCEM, he could not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of other shareholders and therefore lacked standing to
bring his derivative claims. (R.l 149) Although it did not have to, the trial court also held
in the alternative that, because Braun's complaint boiled down to a claim that the Buyout
Group's tender offer price was too low, plaintiffs exclusive remedy was to exercise his
statutory right to an appraisal of his shares pursuant to Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act.
§§ 16-10a-1301, -1302, -1328.

15

(R.l 149); see also Utah Code Ann.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal is baseless.
As a threshold matter, this appeal suffers from two fundamental procedural and
jurisdictional defects. The first is that Braun is not challenging the order from which he
is appealing. Braun is appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing, yet Braun is not challenging the trial
court's decision to do so. This alone requires affirmance of the trial court's May 11,
2009 order of dismissal, or an outright dismissal of this appeal.
The second jurisdictional defect in this appeal is that, in reality, Braun is not
appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal. Rather, Braun is attempting
to appeal from the trial court's oral remarks at the October 15, 2008 hearing on NCEM's
motion to dismiss Braun's initial complaint — the one that Braun voluntarily withdrew.
Braun's attempt to challenge the lower court's oral remarks is improper. To begin with,
the trial court never "concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative, as Braun claims in
this appeal. Even if the trial court did "conclude" that Braun's claims were derivative,
however, oral comments from the bench such as the ones Braun is attempting to
challenge here are simply not appealable. Even more fundamentally, Braun is attempting
in this appeal to resurrect the direct claims that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court.
Having withdrawn those claims voluntarily below, Braun has no right to challenge their
"dismissal" in this appeal. For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this
appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
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tint!

even if Braun had standing to bring his amended derivative complaint (which he did not),
his exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of the value of his
shai es.

1 1 lis Cc ;i n t 1 las held til lat a dissei itii lg shai eholdei 1 i ia> not seek compensatory

damages in addition to the appraisal remedy when his complaint boils down to nothing
more than a complaint about stock price. Bingham Consol Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT
App I 3 4 ? l | ^

.- -

•;..-. • mis case. i>\ .u i.;,,. wwuu. ;»U ii m> amended
'• *«• <-!

derivative complaint on v \ X.\W\ 12, 2008, 'f±u ^

its acquisition of NCEM and, as a practical and legal matter, Braun5 s requests for
corrective disclosures, to block the transaction, and to rescind the transaction, were moot.

Buyout Group's tender offer price of $13.37 per share — a price that 90% of NCEM's
shareholders affirmatively accepted — was too low. Accordingly, the trial court did MO?
:

•

a'i.i-

• statutory npjr

an

appraisal of his shares.
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude somehow that Braun preserved the
issue. , his argui i lei it tl lat 1 lis claii ns at e dii ect (as opposed to derivative) is contrary to
Utah law. A long line of Utah cases makes clear that where, as here, a plaintiff asserts
claims for breach of duty against directors and officers of a corporation, yet fails to allege
ai i ii I ji iry distinct I ron i that suffered by other shareholders collectively, his claims must be
brought derivatively, consistent with the n lie s go\ en lii ig si icl I de rivati v e • claims
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ARGUMENT
I.

Braun's Appeal Is Procedurally Flawed.
As noted above, this appeal suffers from two fundamental procedural and

jurisdictional defects, both of which mandate dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the
trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal.
A.

Braun Does Not Challenge The May 11, 2009 Order Of Dismissal From
Which He Is Appealing.

The first fundamental flaw in this appeal is that Braun is not challenging the order
from which he is appealing. Braun claims to be appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009
order dismissing his amended derivative complaint for lack of standing. (Appellant's Br.
at 1, 14) Yet, Braun makes clear in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court's
conclusion that the consummation of the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM on
October 22, 2008 deprived Braun of standing to assert his purported derivative claims.
(Appellant's Br. at 15 n.4 ("plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's ruling that
completion of a merger eliminates derivative standing")) Thus, Braun concedes that the
trial court did not err when it entered its May 11, 2009 order dismissing his amended
derivative complaint. This concession alone eliminates any jurisdictional basis for this
appeal.
B.

Braun's Attempt To Challenge The Trial Court's October 15, 2008
Oral Comments From The Bench Is Improper.

In reality, Braun is not appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal
at all. Rather, Braun is attempting to appeal from the trial court's preliminary oral
remarks at the October 15, 2008 hearing on NCEM's motion to dismiss Braun's initial
18

complaint. In essence, Braun argues that the trial coin I was wrong win it il suggested a(
the start of that hearing that it was inclined to agree with NCEM's argument that Braun's
claims were derivative as opposed to direct. Indeed, Braun's first and principal argument
in til lis appeal is tf lat ' tl te tit ial o :>i n I: z t i sd ii 1 :: 01 lcli iclii lg tl lat plaintiff s ::laii i is ai e
derivative rather than direct." (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 15-24)
There are several fatal defects in this attempt by Braun to appeal from the trial
coi n t's October 15 2008 pi elh i lii ial y oi al con n nei its

F 'ii si, tl le ti ial coi irt never

"concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative. To the contrary, the court made clear at
the hearing that its comments reflected its "preliminary thinking" (R.l 167 u\ p ' \\ \l u n
ecu lid "'certainly" change its i i lii id after Brai in presented argument t
that it was not telling Braun's counsel that there was no v

.n
:

• ' .,:.

(R.l 167 at p. 17). Notwithstanding these additional comments from the trial court, Braun
voluntarily withdrew his Complaint without presenting any argument. (F 1167 nt r

1

0)

Accordingly; the i u idei l> ing n lotioi I to disi i liss becan ic i i loot, ai id tl i i ti ial • : c i n: t i le v ei
rendered a "conclusion" or issued an order. In short, Braun's principal argument in this
appeal rests on a false premise; it is based on a "conclusion" that the trial court nc\er
reached.
Second, even if the trial court's October 15, 2008 preliminary oral remarks
somehow did amount to a "conclusion" that Braun's claims were derivative and not
direct tlie\ still niiinnf provide :i \vtV\\< for llus appe.il "I'uv. a* lieie, Mie) never became
the basis for a final, appealable order. Jones v. Taylor, 1999 UT App 304, para. 3,
No. 990737, 1999 WL 33244736 (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 ( H a h
19

1978)); see also Black v. Tadahara, 2009 UT App 83, para. 4-5, No. 20090334-CA, 2009
WL 1912589 ("[A]n oral ruling is not an appealable order.").5 Here, the trial court's
October 15, 2008 comments from the bench were rendered moot by Braun's subsequent
decision to voluntarily withdraw his initial complaint and to file an amended derivative
complaint instead.
Third, plaintiff is, in effect, attempting in this appeal to resurrect the direct claims
that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court, and it is axiomatic that a party who
voluntarily dismisses his complaint has no right to appeal that dismissal. See Barton v.
Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Procter &

5

Utah is not alone in this regard. In re Honaker, No. 00AP-1269, 2001 WL 491893,
*6-*7 (Ohio App. 2001) ("[A]ppellantfs assertion of error rests solely on statements
by the trial court at the October 2000 hearing, which statements, appellant contends,
shows that the trial court improperly found that appellant's conviction automatically
warranted termination of appellant's parental rights . . . It is axiomatic, however, that a
court speaks from its journal and not by oral pronouncement from the bench"); DoWop Corp. v. City ofRahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (NJ 2001) ("[I]t is well-settled that
appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions,
informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."); State of
New Mexico v. Lohberger, 144 N.M. 297, 303 (NMSC 2008) ("While all of these
items may have been evidentiary indicia of what the judge had intended to do or of
what he might have said or reported on a given day, none of them constituted an
actual appealable order."); Helmrick v. Helmrick, 95 Wis.2d 554, 556 (Wis. App. Ct.
1980) ("An oral ruling must be reduced to writing and entered before an appeal can be
taken from it."); Alberstadt v. Alberstadt, 257 Md. 552, 553 (Md. App. Ct. 1970)
(parties cannot appeal "from comments by or the opinion of a lower court"); In re
Estate of Lulu Pieper, 224 Cal.App.2d 670, 675 (Cal. App. 1964) (a party cannot
appeal from what is "merely an announcement of the court's intended decision.");
Rust v. Clark County Sck Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689 (Nev. 1987) ("An oral
pronouncement of judgment is not valid for any purpose, NRCP 58(c); therefore, only
a written judgment has any effect, and only a written judgment may be appealed . . .
Appellant. . . should have requested a written judgment from the district court.").
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Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (195b; Bowers i

>
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(8th Cir.1981); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 p i h u . 1978);. Simnh
put, having abandoned them below, Braun has no right to resuscitate his direct claims in
this appeal.
Braun cannot claim that this is unfair, since Braun himself made the strategic
decision to withdraw his initial complaint and to replace it with his amended derivative
Mijl coi irt was wrong when it stated during
the October 15, 2008 hearing that it was inclined to agree \\» ith N CEM that Bi a/i m's
claims were derivative and not direct, then Braun should I M have withdrawn his direct
claims. Rather, the proper course would have been for Braun +o trv to convince the trial
court that it was wrong ana, n u

* ^

his direct claims. Braun, of course, did not do this. He never attempted to convince the
trial court that his claims were direct, not derivative, and he never sought a ruling on
NCEM's mnlinn In ihsiniss 111• I n n l ehiiins, \s <i ir.iill ilinc was never a mii

Vt

alone an order dismissing Braun's direct claims, from which Braun could appeal.
Instead, Braun made the strategic decision v ^ ->hdnnv his direct claims and file
derivative c1

>lace — «fni\ iitin 1 damis lluil everyone,, even Braun, now

agrees he lacked standing to bring once the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of
NCEM, at which time Braun ceased to be a shareholder. Having voluntarily withdrawn
f»

.•-

.--•

:plain now. i Vt bottom, flu- JISI • ' lii.aia's

appeal is that he rode the wrong horse. But that is not a reason u
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ee.

For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this appeal, and this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
II.

The Trial Court Did Not Err In Holding In The Alternative That Braun's
Exclusive Remedy Was To Exercise His Statutory Right to An Appraisal.
Although it did not have to do so, the trial court also determined that, even if

Braun had standing to bring his amended derivative complaint (which he did not), his
exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right of appraisal. It was surely correct in
doing so.
This Court has recognized that "[i]n most jurisdictions, an appraisal proceeding is
the sole remedy available to a shareholder dissenting to a merger." See Bingham, 2004
UT App 434, TJ30; see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1302(5) (limiting dissenting
shareholder to dissenter's rights, including appraisal remedy). This Court has also held
that a dissenting shareholder may not seek compensatory damages in addition to this
statutory appraisal remedy when his complaint boils down to nothing more than a
complaint about stock price. See Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, ^f 33 (citing Szaloczi v.
John R. Behrmann Revocable Trust, 90 P.3d 835, 840-42 (Colo. 2004) ("A dissenting
shareholder may not seek compensatory damages in addition to the appraisal remedy
when the complaint boils down to nothing more than a complaint about stock price.")
(quotation omitted)).
That is exactly this case. As noted above, Braun filed his amended derivative
complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same day the Buyout Group completed its
acquisition of NCEM. {See R.949; R. 1007-08) Intentionally or otherwise, Braun in this
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had on his amended derivative complaint's claims for relief. Braun also forgets certain of
his key representations to the trial court, regarding the nature oi - »•- uatms
post-acqi lisitioi 1
Specifically, Braun fails to recognize that the consummation of the acquisition
rendered moot aily request in the amended derivative complaint for supplemental or
corrective disclosures concerning the transactor

\m--AM-»I.//-

•,< <<>; ies,

Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 362 (Del. Ch. 2008) ("The merger has happened; the metaphorical
merger eggs have been scrambled.'
corrective disclosures at this stage wouu
;l

in jury ^iH,^,!

An injunctive order requiring supplemental,
e an exercise v.- .i.Iity and frivolity

- • • * • ^ -.niiL-nu -»i ,. ::.cu iignt to cast informed votes

on the merger . . . [and] that injury is no longer redressable.").
Similarly, Braun fails to acknowledge that the completion of the acquisition
mooted 1 lis reqi lest foi ai I ii i ji n lctioi I blocking the ti ai isaction

1 Jeedless to say , once an

acquisition occurs, blocking it from occurring is nu lunger an option. See In re Lukens
Inc. Shareholders

Litigation,

757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch. 1999) (after merger closes,

"[m]one> damages [are] tl le oi i.I> possible foi it i I of i: elie f a/v ailable")
Finally, Braun fails to recognize in his brief on appeal that, upon completion of the
acquisition, any claim for rescission of the transaction was utterly impractical and legally
baseless. See McMillan v. Intercargo Coi j '., 768 \2A I 492, 500 (T)c 1 CI i 2000) [i ti it * ; i
merger has been consummated, "the metaphorical merger eggs have been scrambled,"
and "it is generally accepted that a completed merger cannot, as a practical matter, be

unwound."); Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 831, 834 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("the practical
difficulties of undoing purchases made by good faith purchasers for value on a national
securities exchange lends additional weight to defendants' position" that rescission is
impractical); RGC Intern. Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., No. Civ. A. 17674,
2000 WL 1706728, at *16 n.59 (Del. Ch. 2000) (granting motion to dismiss claim for
rescission of merger and noting "the general rule that it is impractical to unwind a
consummated merger involving publicly traded corporations whose shares were held by
numerous stockholders.").6

Indeed, Braun conceded as much below, when he

represented the following to the trial court:
Plaintiff realizes that his requested relief of rescission is no longer viable
now that the Proposed Buyout has closed because of the difficulty in
unscrambling the merger eggs. Thus, plaintiff intends to amend his
complaint to seek a damage remedy.
6 Braun's request for rescission in this case was particularly inappropriate, given his
decision on October 15, 2008 to withdraw his motion to enjoin the acquisition before
it was consummated on October 22, 2008. See In re LNR Property Corp.
Shareholders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 179 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Having allowed the merger
to close without seeking an injunction, the plaintiffs cannot now seek . . . to rescind
and set aside the merger"); In re J. P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholders Litig., 906
A.2d 808, 825 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("[PJlaintiffs did not seek an injunction to stop the
merger before it closed ... Now, of course, the 'eggs' have been irretrievably
'scrambled' and there is no possibility of effective equitable relief."); Clements v.
Rogers, 790 A.2d 1222, 1238 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("Clements did little to support her
current litigation position by continuing to plead a rescission claim in her two
complaints after she made a tactical decision not to seek to prevent the
consummation of the merger.") (emphasis added); In re Lukens, 151 A.2d at 728
("[Pjlaintiffs' demand for rescission of the transaction is plainly futile. Even
disregarding plaintiffs' failure to pursue injunctive relief prior to the shareholder vote,
although that option was readily available, it goes without saying that at this juncture
it is "impossible to unscramble the eggs." Money damages being the only possible
form of relief available ....") (emphasis in original).
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(R I l l 71 it n K )
In short, because events had overtaken it, Braun's amended derivative complaint
boiled down to nothing more than a complaint tl mt tl: ic Bi ry 01 it Gi oup* s tendei 3ffei pi ice
of $13 37 per share w as too lo w, even though that price represented a 36% premium over
the market price of NCEM's stock immediately before the tender offer, and even though
the holders of more than 90°<> *>; \ . hM's shares readily accepted
967) Brai in adi i litted this below , it : c

:

"
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[Braun's] allegations are now necessarily focused on unfair price." (R. 1116-1117
(emphasis added))
A c c o r d i n g . Ilu lii.il i
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remedy was an appraisal of his shares, and that his amended derivative complaint should
be dismissed. See Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, ^ 3 1 ("Appraisal is appropriate under
such circumstances because it awards esse UJH .

\v.v •

<>>•{

avoids the danger of awarding duplicate damages that would otherwise result from a
separate tort action for compensatory damages.'5); see also Weinstein v. Appelbaum, 193
F.Supp.2d / / 4 'Xll (S.D.N "Y li)i)l) (applying Delaware law) (A mnmrik slutefmldei *
exclusn

i n u , : ..-!' a p p r a i s a i "yields only to an exception where the stockholder

properly alleges bad faith which goes beyond the issues of mere inadequacy of price")
(internal quotation omitted); Green . .v,,, «,- /-t /•.(-.;
1^)87) (saim:).
Braun argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his derivative claims because
the amended derivative complaint alleges unlawful acts in connection with the merger.
25

(Appellant's Br. at 25-30) In support of this argument, Braun relies heavily on this
Court's decision in Bingham Consol Co. v. Groesbeck, but that case actually supports the
trial court's ruling. In Bingham, the appellant challenged a trial court's consideration of
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in arriving at "fair value" within the context of an
appraisal proceeding. See 2004 UT App 434, f 29-30. While Bingham recognized the
fraud exception, it did not apply it, holding instead that the exception should not apply
"when [a dissenting shareholder] claims, in essence, that the primary effect of the ...
breach of fiduciary duty was to diminish share value." Id. at ^f 31. That is precisely the
case here, as Braun himself concedes. (R.1117) ("the crux of his allegations are now
necessarily focused on unfair price.") Under such circumstances — where "the primary
effect" of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty "was to diminish share value" — Bingham
makes clear that a plaintiff is "limited to the appraisal remedy." 2004 UT App 434 at
131.
Braun cites a Nevada case, Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., asserting that Cohen
considered and rejected the contention that a plaintiff whose claims boil down to
allegations of unfair price should be limited to an appraisal remedy. (Appellant's Br. at
28) Cohen, of course, is not controlling. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Cohen
involved direct rather than derivative claims.

Indeed, the Cohen court applied the

continuous ownership rule to dismiss all derivative claims by former shareholders, and
only applied the fraud exception to the direct claims that survived. See 62 P.3d 720, 732
(Nev. 2003) ("a former shareholder does not have standing to assert a derivative claim.").
Under Cohen, then, Braun's derivative complaint was correctly dismissed in its entirety.
26
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recognize an exception to the general rule that dissenters are bound to an appraisal
proceeding whenever derivative claims allege fraud or breach ~f fiduciary duty.
(Appellai it's Bi at 28 30) Bi it Bi ai in igi 101 es n lot e recent case law clarify ing tl le scope
of this so-called "fraud exception" and making clear that it 01lly applies "[w]here the
merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, being perpetrated merely to deprive
shareholders of the standing to bi ii ig a derivative a d i 899 (Del. 2004).

Lew ^ \ n !t/w A -. \.. <.. - -<-•

Ihere are no allegations in this case suggesting such a scenario.

Indeed, it would be factually impossible, since Braun's original complaint was not filed
until after the merger was already negotiated and publicly announced to shareholders, and
his amet ided deri\ ative ecu i lplaii it was i lot I lied I intil se\ ei a! w eeks later, tl: le san le day
the acquisition was completed. See Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 661 (Del. Cli,
2007) (fraud exception did not apply where merger was "culmination of a two-year
process, beginning ele\ ei 11 i lot ill: is 'be! bi: e [ plaii ltiff] filed tl lis la vv si lit ' )
At bottom, Braun's doomsday scenario — that "controlling shareholders . . . could
engage in oppressive tactics in breach of their fiduciary duties, and then escape liability
for

•

•

•;legating r i lii IC :t: it> si iare 1: lolders ii ito an appraisal

proceeding," (Appellant's Br. at 29) — simply is unfounded. To the extent that Braun or
any other dissenting shareholder wanted to challenge the NCEM board's process for
shopping the company, they wei e free to do so in ai i appi aisal proceeding. See Bingham,
2004 UT App 434 at \"32 ("'I Tjhe court may consider evidence of breach of fiduciary
duty in an appraisal to assess the credibility of
r/

[a] proposed valuation."); In re

Netsmart Tech.} Inc. Shareholders Litig, 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("In an
appraisal, the failure of the Netsmart board to test the market for strategic buyers in an
active way will have relevance."); Alabama-By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255,
257 (Del. 1991) (affirming lower court's determination that "if corporate fiduciaries
engage in self-dealing and fix the merger price by procedures not calculated to yield a
fair price, these facts should, and will, be considered in assessing the credibility of the
respondent corporations' valuation contentions" in the appraisal context) (quotations and
citations omitted).
In sum, the trial court correctly held in the alternative that Plaintiffs sole remedy
is an appraisal proceeding, and its decision should therefore be affirmed.
III.

Braun's Breach-Of-Duty Claims Are Derivative, Not Direct.
As noted above, Braun devotes most of his energies in this appeal to his initial

complaint, and to the direct claims therein that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court.
This Court need not address those withdrawn claims in order to resolve this appeal, but if
the Court is inclined to do so, it should reject Braun's argument that they were direct and
not derivative.
Utah law clearly states that a claim for breach of fiduciary duties by directors of a
corporation belongs to the corporation, not to the individual shareholders, and that such a
claim must be brought, if at all, as a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation. As
Utah courts, including this Court, have repeatedly held, "claims of fiduciary breach" such
as Braun's claims here "fall squarely in the category of claims that Utah law recognizes
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as classically derivi itiv< \ " G F 1 ,P I it /. i \ CI Mgmt I tt L 2007 I J I A j )| > 131 1" 9, 163 I } 3d
636; see also Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23,fflf1344, 134 P.3d 1139.
Braun relies on several Delaware cases in support of his argument that his claims
are direct, rather than derivative
and

*

•:

,IK-K isacruci.i'
•

{

::

^> : H, M\

uforce breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate

directors and, as such, Braun5s reliance on these Delaware cases is misplaced. (See, e.g.,
Appellant's Br. at 19-24) While Delaware courts appear to allow a direct actio!], at least
ii i sen i: ic it istai ices, whei i. corporate directors bread i f idi iciai y di ities, I Jtah coi n ts I: lave
expressly ruled that, except in the narrow instance of a closely held corporation, a direct
action is not permitted because no individualized injury exists.
I'u

i

. .i •
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)1 1 P 2d 636

(Utah 1980), stated that "[a]s a general rule, directors and other officers of a corporation
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation."

Id at 6"°

Wl rile the plaintiff in

Richardson claimed, like the plaintiff here, that corporate directors owe fidnr.iarv duties
not-

'<--. -.

a aiso IU

••shareholder

0u ^ - •* i*"i --tated thai in uuui, it

is clear that [a fiduciary] relation is to the stockholders collectively," as opposed to the
individual shareholders.
fid'* » II

-

/

,nr i nun then noted that "[t]he distinction between a
""' in- J- i^ a \ M"1

-• . . *i'ii '. ••u- stockholders

collectively does not appear to be one of substance in this case," and found that "the
claim for relief belongs to the corporation." Id, at 639 640, 1he Richardson court went
on lei slate

The rule in Utah is that mismanagement of the corporation
gives rise to a cause of action in the corporation, even if the
mismanagement results in damage to stockholders by
depreciating the value of the corporation's stock. . . .
Therefore, any compensatory damages which may be
recovered on account of any breach by defendants of their
fiduciary duty as directors and officers or arising as a result of
mismanagement of the corporation by defendants belong to
the corporation and not to the stockholders individually.
Id. at 640.
Subsequent rulings by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have
echoed the Richardson Court's statement that a breach of fiduciary duty claim belongs to
the corporation, and not to the individual shareholder. In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.,
2000 UT 102, 20 P.3d 868, the Utah Supreme Court stated that

u

[c]laims of

mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and appropriation or waste of corporate
opportunities are claims that the corporation has been injured. Accordingly, the cause of
action belongs to the corporation and shareholders may sue only on its behalf." Id. at
112. Similarly, in GFLP, Ltd. v. CL Mgrnt., Ltd, 2007 UT App 131, 163 P.2d 636, this
Court found that a shareholder's "claims of fiduciary breach, excessive fees,
commingling of fees, and mismanagement of property each fall squarely in the category
of claims that Utah law recognizes as classically derivative. Id. at ^f 9 (emphasis added).
These and other Utah cases make clear that, in order for a corporate shareholder to
maintain a direct claim against corporate officers or directors, the shareholder "must
show that he or she was injured in a manner distinct from the corporation." Warner,
2000 UT 102, If 13. In GFLP, Ltd, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiff
shareholder's claim for injury distinct from that of the corporation when the shareholder's
30

clain\.

: jiiiy was that it received reduced distributions from the corporation due to

director misconduct.

20*07 LJ I App 1.31, "| :

>^

GFLP

court foi 11 id tl mt 1 he

shareholder's injury of reduced distributions was linked \M -ne financial injury to the
eorpoi alien ( „ni niii;: (in1 iedn< n) itishihuln is mill lli.il. therefore, the * hum belonged IM
the corporation, not the shareholder. Id.

Similarly, in Dansie, the Utah Supreme Court

rejected a shareholder's claim of an injury distinct from the corporation when company
insidei s t:t ansfei i: ed assets of tl le corporatioi I to tl lei i isel\ es
remaining shareholders.

2006 UT 23, %% 11-14.

claims [were] classically derivative: the value <
Plaintiffs 5 shares iii it, was diminished

to tl le detrin lei it :)f the

fhe Court found that the "Plaintiffs
r

'k- Company, aiid by extension

die transfer M M;. C o m p a n y ' s assets to the

City. Plaintiffs were injured because the Company was injured." Id. at % 13.
Braun's claim here is precisely the same as the claims of the plaintiffs in the
aforementioned cases and, as in those cases, must be broiiglit as a derivative claim.
Brai u l suffered

froi i i tl lat :)f otl lei si lai: el lolders of tl ite corpoi ation. His

central allegation in this case is that the directors of Nevada Chemicals did not disclose
adequate information and did not secure a sufficient price for the Company.

Braun

claii ns, essentiall} , tl lat the directors 1 lad a cli lty • :>f greater" disclosi ire at id a di it> to
negotiate a higher price, but he does not and cannot claim how those duties were owed to
him separately from other shareholders. Any entitlement to disclosure would apply to all

allegedly inadequate price, such an injur-

is no different than th^ :niiir\ i urportedly

suffered by all shareholders (even those who affirmatively tendered their shares in
31

response to the Buyout Group's offer). Accordingly, Braun's claim of injury, like the
plaintiffs claim in GFLP, Ltd., is tied to the collective shareholder or corporate injury
and must be brought as a derivative claim.
In sum, if the trial court had ruled that Plaintiffs claims were derivative (which it
did not), that ruling would have been correct, and there was no error below.

32

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated herein, Braun's appeal from the trial court's May 11,
2009 01 dei* dismissii ig his ai nei idled dei iv ative coi nplaii it foi lac k :d jurisdictioi i lacks
merit, and the trial court's order should be affirmed.
DATED this ^ H & y of December 2009
By:

PARR BRCW% GEE & LOVELESS, PC

Robert S/ClaVk
Stephen^, wj. Hale
Jenifer L. Tdmchak
and
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

John F. Hartmann
Michael A. Duffy
Daniel C. Moore
Attorneys for Appellees Nevada Chemicals Inc.,
Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso
Acquisition Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and
OCMPrincipal Opportunities Fund IV, L P.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRVING S. BRAUN, Derivatively On Behalf
of NEVADA CHEMICALS INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
E. BRYAN BAGLEY, NATHAN L. WADE,
JOHN T. DAY, JAMES E. SOLOMON, M.
GARFIELD COOK, OAKTREE CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, L.P., CALYPSO
ACQUISITION CORP., CYANCO
HOLDING CORP., and OCM PRINCIPAL
OPPORTUNITIES FUND IV, L.P.,
Defendants,
and
NEVADA CHEMICALS INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Nominal Party.

290081

Civil No. 080919636
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

On April 24, 2009, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Derivative
Complaint came on for hearing. Stephen E. W. Hale, Jenifer L. Tomchak, and Daniel Moore
appeared on behalf of Defendants Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso Acquisition
Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., OCM Principal Opportunities Fund IV, L.P., and Nominal
Defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc.; Mark F. James appeared on behalf of the individual
Defendants, former directors of Nevada Chemicals, Inc.; and David T. Wissbroecker and
Heather M. Sneddon appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Irving S. Braun. The Court, having
reviewed the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Derivative Complaint and
supporting papers and those in opposition thereto, having heard and considered the cirguments by
the parties on that Motion, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter,
and determined that good cause is shown, the Court finds that:
(A)

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a derivative action inasmuch as he is no longer a

shareholder of Nevada Chemicals, Inc., and therefore does not fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the shareholders, and
(B)

Plaintiffs remedy for the claims alleged in the Amended Derivative Complaint is

to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of his shares as provided by Utah law;
THE COURT, THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as
follows:
1.

290081

Defendants' Motion shall be and hereby is GRANTED;

2

2.

All claims that were or could have been asserted by Plaintiff Irving S. Braun in

the Amended Derivative Complaint in the above captioned lawsuit are hereby dismissed with
prejudice upon the merits.
DATED this J j _ day of.

Wk&M

2009.
BY THE COURT:

C*S>^Xsyj?U+y^

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
Third Judicial District Court

29008J
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*ii £S DISTRICT COURT

OCT 'I 3 2008
SAL) L A £ £ *"<•

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Jon V. Harper (#1378)
Heather M. Sneddon (#9520)
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801/534-1700
801/364-7697 (fax)

By

Attorneys for Plaintiff
[Additional counsel appear on signature page.]

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRVING S. BRAUN, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

NEVADA CHEMICALS INC., E. BRYAN
BAGLEY, NATHAN L. WADE, JOHN T.
DAY, JAMES E. SOLOMON, M. GARFIELD
COOK, OAKTREE CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, L.P., CALYPSO
ACQUISITION CORP., CYANCO
HOLDING CORP. and OCM PRINCIPAL
OPPORTUNITIES FUND IV, L.P.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 080919636
Judge Sandra Peuler

INfV

This matter came before the Court on October 15, 2008, at 9:00 a,m. before the
Honorable Sandra Peuler for a hearing on Defendant Nevada Chemicals' Motion to Dismiss
Complaint; Plaintiff Irving S. Braun's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Plaintiffs Motion
for Reconsideration of His Request for Expedited Discovery. Plaintiff was represented by David
T. Wissbroecker of Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins, LLP, and Heather M. Sneddon of
Anderson & Karrenberg, P.C. Defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc., was represented by Stephen
E. W. Hale of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. Defendants Nathan L. Wade, John T.
Day, James E. Solomon and M. Garfield Cook were represented by Mark F. James of Hatch,
James & Dodge, P.C. Defendant E. Bryan Bagley was represented by Jefferson W. Gross of
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross. Defendants Oaktree Capital Management, LP, Calypso Acquisition
Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund IV, L.P., were represented
by John F. Hartmann of Kirkland Ellis LLP, and Christopher B. Sullivan of Howrey LLP.
Plaintiffs counsel had informed respective counsel for Defendants the afternoon prior to
the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction that Plaintiff did not intend to proceed with
the hearing on October 15, 2008, and, at the October 15, 2008, hearing, Plaintiff formally
withdrew his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, based upon the documents on file
with the Court and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of His Request for Expedited Discovery is

2.

Based upon Defendants' stipulation, Plaintiff shall file an amended derivative

denied.

complaint with the Court no later than October 22, 2008. The amended derivative complaint
2

may include allegations and claims in addition to those set forth in the proposed amended
complaint already submitted to the Court. Defendants are permitted to lodge any objections they
may have to Plaintiffs new amended derivative complaint to the extent the new amended
derivative complaint includes allegations and claims in addition to those set forth in the proposed
amended complaint already submitted to the Court.
3.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendant Nevada Chemicals5 Motion to Dismiss

Complaint is moot.
Dated this ^

day of Q - o h ; 2008.
BY THE COURT:

< ^ w / - ^ y

Tflfcfe Honorable Sandra Peki]
Third District Court Judged
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Stephen E. W. Hale
Attorney for Defendant Nevada Chemicals,
Inc.
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HEARING
This case comes before the Court for a hearing on the defendants'
motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. Appearances as shown.
The matter is argued to the Court by respective counsel and the
Court ORDERS:
1. A stipulation is reached that the plaintiff can amend the
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 15, 2008

2

JUDGE SANDRA PEULER

3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Good morning.

Let me note that we are

7

on the record.

8

Braun vs. Nevada Chemicals.

9

And may I ask counsel to please state your appearances for

10

The matter before the Court this morning is
The case number is 080919636.

the record?

11

MS. SNEDDON:

Your Honor, Heather Sneddon and David

12

Wissbroecker for the plaintiff.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HALE:

15

MR. JAMES:

Mark James, Your Honor, on behalf of

four of the defendant directors.

18
19

Steve Hale on behalf of the defendant,

Nevada Chemicals, Inc.

16
17

Thank you.

MR. GROSS:

Jefferson Gross on behalf of Defendant

Bagley.

20

MR. HARTMAN:

Your Honor, John Hartman and behind

21

me Chris Sullivan for the buyer group defendants who are

22

Oaktree Capital Management LC,; Calypso Acquisition Corp.,

23

Cyanco Holding Corp, and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund for

24

LT.

25

THE COURT:

Thank you very much for your

1

appearances.

2

some messages yesterday afternoon.

3
4

Tell me what's happening this morning.

MR. WISSBROECKER:

I got

Your Honor, David Wissbroecker

for the plaintiff.

5

THE COURT:

Thank you.

6

MR. WISSBROECKER:

As the Court is aware, we had

7

the preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for today and we

8

were hoping to be able to secure additional documents in

9

advance of that, so that's why we filed the Motion for

10

Reconsideration last Thursday when it became clear that we

11

were not going to have access to the internal company

12

documents.

13

be able to cross examine the witnesses without those

14

documents available, and so we determined that we did not

15

want to go forward with the preliminary injunction hearing

16

today.

17

We determined that it would be not practical to

We informed defendants of that.
We - I think sometime around 2:30 is when we began

18

discussions to let them know that, you know, people that were

19

out of town didn't have to travel because we weren't going to

20

go forward with the evidentiary hearing on the preliminary

21

injunction hearing.

22

So what we would like the Court to do though today,

23

is to reconsider, or to grant our Motion for Reconsideration

24

and allow us access to those documents that - and we could be

25

able to present the Court with an evidentiary basis for the

1

preliminary injunction motion.

2

with briefing citing to some federal case law on Rule 26,

3

which Utah courts have held should be read to help interpret

4

the Utah rules when there's no case law on point in Utah.

5

And we presented the Court

And the rules - as the advisory committee notes,

6

the cases that apply in those notes demonstrate that when the

7

circumstances are exigent, when there's, you know, a brief

8

period of time that plaintiffs can seek relief from the

9

court, injunctive relief, that in those circumstances it is

10

appropriate for the Court to grant expedited discovery and

11

good cause exists in those circumstances.

12

The Mirave (phonetic) case is the one that we cited

13

in the papers that's pretty much right on point.

14

tender offer.

15

notes and, you know, existing case law said, it's not as

16

defendants suggest, a fishing expedition.

17

proof.

18

It's a

The Court relying on those advisory committee

It's a problem of

When you're on a preliminary injunction motion, as

19

the Court's aware, there's a burden to demonstrate

20

entitlement success on the merits that requires evidence and

21

in those circumstances the Courts have agreed that parties

22

should be allowed access to those expedited discovery

23

documents.

24
25

And we would think that are reviewing these
submissions that defendants gave the Court yesterday, their

1

motion, or their opposition to our motion for a preliminary

2

injunction hearing, we think that demonstrates further the

3

information that we're alleging exists does exist.

4

number of those items that we suggested to the Court were

5

material details, material information that needed to be

6

disclosed before the tender offer closed.

7

And a

The defendant has identified a number cf those

8

factual details in the papers yesterday.

And although those

9

are unsupported, they didn't present the evidence.

We think

10

that demonstrates clearly that the evidence exists, and it's

11

in their possession, and that if the Court would permit us to

12

have access to that evidence, that we could present an

13

evidentiary basis for the relief we're seeking.

14

And we ask the Court for even a more narrow subset.

15

We ask for just the board books and the board minutes, which

16

would include the analysis of the financial advisor.

17

have the statements that defendants made in their opposition

18

to preliminary injunction to the effect of that there was an

19

analysis of special dividend and the networking capital

20

requirement.

21

information about the price that was paid for the other half

22

of the joint venture.

23

that, because they're denied access to that information by an

24

agreement between Oaktree and Avonic.

25

That information was there.

And we

There was

Defendants have stated they don't know

Our view would be that that's material information

and we would like to get the access to those documents to
present that information to the Court.

We informed

defendants that we're not intending to proceed with the
preliminary injunction today.

So I'm not asking the Court to

grant that, and I don't want to be, you know, the defendants
to say that I've misrepresented what our position was because
that's - it was our position we took yesterday with
defendants is the position we're taking today.
But we think that if given access to those
documents we could come back before the Court in very short
order and we would be asking for even a narrower set of
relief given the exigencies, just the disclosure of the
information, not getting into the process details, and there
would be a decision for the Court to make.

The standard is

whether or not - it's an objective standard, whether or not a
reasonable investor would consider that information material
to the determination of, you know, how to tender their shares
or to seek appraisal.
And we think that's a determination the Court could
make at a fairly concise factual record if we proceeded on an
injunction remedy that was just on the basis of disclosures.
I would suggest that it would not even be necessary to have
live witnesses.

It would be just a determination of the

documents themselves and whether or not the information
contained in those documents, which would be presented to the

1
2

Court, is material information that should be disclosed.
And for that reason, we think it's important that

3

the Court address our Motion for Reconsideration even though

4

we're not prepared to go forward on the existing record with

5

the preliminary injunction motion.

6

we take today.

7
8
9

THE COURT:

And that's the position

Can I just ask, did you anticipate

today that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss would be heard?
MR. WISSBROECKER:

We were informed, and we had

10

discussions with the defendant - now I'm not going to hold

11

them to this because they may, you know, want to still get

12

this heard on an expedited basis, but we were informed that

13

they did not want to go forward, that they were not prepared

14

to go forward with that today.

15

the defendants stipulating to allowing an amendment.

16

would, you know, put things off, and then they would have the

17

opportunity to move to dismiss an amended complaint, which

18

makes sense, because they've just moved to dismiss on legal

19

issues, and it might result in seriatim briefing of motions

20

to dismiss based on factual legal issues.

21

discussion that we had.

22

the Court of whatever their position is on that.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. HALE:

25

We had some discussions about
And we

And that was the

I'll let them make whatever - inform

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Your Honor, this is a case where Mr.

Braun, as we've just recently learned, holds 200 shares out

1

of over seven million shares of Nevada Chemicals stock and he

2

is trying to hold hostage a deal that would allow the

3

shareholders to have a 36 percent premium over the last day

4

trading before the deal was made public.

5

lawsuit, and I have learned recently much about 14-D-9

6

disclosures by the SEC, and I'm sure you have been exposed to

7

that as well.

8
9

And they filed the

They filed their lawsuit a week before that
disclosure even showed up.

And we've done some of our own

10

discovery outside of the normal formalities and discovered

11

that Mr. Braun does this for a living.

12

go forward with the preliminary injunction hearing today, we

13

would have shown that that is something that he engages in

14

frequently, and he knows and should have known that the

15

14-D-9 was a disclosure that was about to be filed and hadn't

16

been filed when he filed the lawsuit.

17

If we were allowed to

This is a strike lawsuit, Your Honor.

And Mr.

18

Braun asked for expedited discovery to begin with and we came

19

to your chambers, as you recall, and we talked about whether

20

that should be the case

21

him to file a motion for a preliminary injunction, and deal

22

with the irreparable harm in that respect.

23

or not.

And he - and you instructed

We had a Motion to Dismiss on file that has now

24

been fully briefed that is dispositive of the issue that is

25

before the Court at this point in time.
7

There are a number of moving part s, and they keep

1
2

moving.

3

stop, sstop moving.

4

to proceed in an orderly manner.

5

being able to have discovery.

6

all of the directors, and they subpoenaed the CFO.

7

of them, Your Honor, were ready to come to testify today.

8
9

In order to disable this machine, we need them to
And it seems; to me that this matter ought
They had their shot at

We flew in - they subpoenaed
And all

We flew out Mr. Seth VanVorhees from the east coast
in New Jersey, and he was with us yesterday morning.

We

10

spent the day preparing him to come and testify and explain.

11

He's the company's investment advisor.

12

explain and respond to the allegations that have been made in

13

this complaint.

14

author of the Kristen Berry report that the plaintiff

15

complains he doesn't have the information necessary to make a

16

decision about whether to sell his shares and offer them in

17

response to the tender offer, or to hold on to his shares.

18

He was going to

We also flew out Mr. Hence, who was the

All of these people, Your Honor, were prepared to

19

come and testify.

20

of those witnesses.

21

One of Mr. Braun's complaints in this action is that Nevada

22

Chemicals failed to disclose what Oaktree Capital paid to

23

Cyplus (phonetic), to buy Cyplus' interest in Cyanco.

24

are you familiar with - that they failed to disclose that.

25

And Mr. Braun could have examined any one
And let me give you just one example.

And

If the witnesses had been allowed to testify, and

1

if counsel had asked them the question, the answer would have

2

been, as we said in our opposition to their Motion for

3

Preliminary Injunction, the reason it wasn't disclosed is

4

there's a confidentiality agreement, and we don't know what

5

was paid.

6

Your Honor, could have been asked today if we'd gone forward

7

with the preliminary injunction.

It's that simple.

8
9

And those kinds of questions,

And Mr. Braun could have evaluated for himself the
information that he complains that he doesn't have.

The

10

information that Kristen Berry used and relied upon, he could

11

have examined the witness today and found out what Kristen

12

Berry relied upon in connection with giving their fairness

13

opinion, which, as you know, Your Honor, they opined that the

14

$13.37 was a fair price for the shareholders.

15

allowed to go forward and have the CFO of Nevada Chemicals

16

testify, he would have said he'd gone through all the history

17

of what this stock had traded at over the last decade, and it

18

has never traded in excess

19

And if we were

of $13.37.

And I think the Court can take judicial notice -

20

maybe you do or don't have a 401K, but everybody in America

21

has lost —

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HALE:

- take that information.
Everybody has lost in the last four

24

weeks.

And Mr. Braun marches into this Court with 200 shares

25

and says, one, I want to hurry up and get expedited discovery

1

and gets told, no, let's have a preliminary injunction.

2

he says, oh, I don't want to do it today, when he could have

3

asked the questions today and gotten the information.

4

Then he does something that's unique.

Then

He opposes

5

our Motion to Dismiss by attaching a Motion for Leave of

6

Court to Amend his complaint.

7

motion has been filed with the court or not, but he attaches

8

it, arguing as a subsidiary argument to the Motion to Dismiss

9

that if you're going to claim it's a derivative claim then,

I don't know whether that

10

you know, here's my amended complaint to satisfy the

11

deficiencies in his pleadings.

12

We find out, Your Honor, I had asked the Court

13

let's identify witnesses two days in advance so everybody can

14

get prepared and exchange exhibits and we did.

15

Gross, who represents one of the directors, specifically

16

asked if Mr. Braun was going to show up at the hearing on

17

Monday.

18

up today, never planned to show up for the hearing today, and

19

I'm sensitive to the reasons why that were explained to us.

20

He had religious observances that prohibited him. But Mr.

21

Braun knew about that matter when this matter got set for a

22

preliminary injunction hearing.

23

it at another time so that he could show up.

24
25

And Mr.

And it turns out that Mr. Braun wasn't going to show

And he should have scheduled

Your Honor, this is the third time we've been in
front of you for expedited matters.

And it seems to me that
10

1

it's time to let this lawsuit take its course.

2

if the plaintiff is going to amend the complaint, let's have

3

that stipulation that the complaint is going to be amended

4

and then we will deal in due course with whether that is a

5

legitimate claim or not.

6

amended complaint, then I think we need to deal with the

7

Motion to Dismiss, because if you grant the Motion to

8

Dismiss, we all go home and then they can file later on

9

whatever it is they think they need to file.

10

We ought to -

If they're not going to file their

But there's no sense

in leaving that moving part

11

continuing to move.

12

right now, that they're going to file an amended complaint,

13

and we will consent to it, or if they're not going to file

14

it, then let's have the Motion to Dismiss decided.

15

Either he ought to stipulate today,

Number two, with respect to the request for

16

expedited discovery, again, number one,

17

to Dismiss and even if we decide that they're going to amend

18

their complaint, there will be another Motion to Dismiss.

19

there is no reason, Your Honor, for the defendants, who have

20

gone through tremendous expense in attorney's fees and flying

21

people from back east to this court where they had the

22

opportunity to take a free shot and there's not a better

23

place to take a free shot at discovery than at a preliminary

24

injunction hearing.

25 J

there is the Motion

So

And so I think with all due respect, that if we're
11

1

going to proceed with this lawsuit that it ought to go in the

2

normal course so that parties, in particular the defendants,

3

are not continuing to incur the tremendous expense and the

4

uncertainty about what's going on.

5

the Court, I know this is sort of unusual, is to ask counsel,

6

are you going to amend your complaint or not?

7

THE COURT:

So I guess what I'd ask

Well, let me - could I give you sort of

8

my take on this that I was thinking about before you all came

9

this morning?

I mean - and admittedly, I've not heard

10

arguments on any of the substantive issues, but this is where

11

my thinking is going after I read everything yesterday.

12

think number one, that the Motion to Dismiss is well taken.

13

I think that the claim, if it's going to be brought, must be

14

brought as a derivative action.

15

argument, and unless someone changed my mind for me this

16

morning, which certainly could happen, I would be inclined to

17

grant the Motion to Dismiss.

18

I

So if I were to hear

So the next step in there is, there was a motion to

19

file an amended complaint seeking a derivative claim, which

20

has not been responded to but is on file.

21

and I was looking for the section and I couldn't put my hands

22

on it because I don't usually use these books, but in order

23

to survive a Motion to Dismiss the derivative complaint, the

24

plaintiff must meet all the requirements of the statute,

25

which include the notice, and I can't remember, I think it's

It seems to me,

12

1

a 90-day waiting period -

2

MR. HALE:

3

THE COURT:

That's correct.
— or notice period.

In order to

4

survive a Motion to Dismiss, I believe that the plaintiff

5

would then have to demonstrate irreparable harm if they had

6

to wait that period of time, which gets us back to the

7

irreparable harm issue, which I think, based upon the

8

briefing that I read, is a legal argument.

9

might be briefed at that point, but just looking at what had

I don't know what

10

already been briefed, it didn't seem to me that there were

11

factual disputes, but there were arguments about the law to

12

be applied to determine whether or not the plaintiff would

13

suffer irreparable harm.

14

So that's where I think we'd end up.

And I admit

15

it's kind of circular, but that was my thinking.

16

plaintiffs could then demonstrate that and survive a Motion

17

to Dismiss, then at that point, I think I would be inclined

18

to order some expedited discovery.

19

And if the

I don't know that we're there yet, because the

20

Motion to File and Amended Complaint, and certainly if it's

21

stipulated to, great, has not been responded to and, you

22

know, there hasn't been irreparable harm established, at

23

least in terms of my finding in this court.

24

any sense to anybody?

25

MR. HALE:

Does that make

What you're saying makes sense.

It may
13

1

make sense for us to caucus for a minute.

2

THE COURT:

I've got lots of —

Oh, I understand that and I haven't

3

heard from them and I'm sure they want to be heard, and I'm

4

sure the plaintiff wants to respond to what I've said as

5

well.

That's just kind of my preliminary thinking.

6

MR. HALE:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HALE:

9

Okay.
Do you want me to leave the room?
We can walk out in the hall.

You don't

have to leave the room.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HALE:

12

THE COURT:

All right.
Thank you, Your Honor.
I'm just going to ask Kathy to stay on

13

the record *cause it takes us a while to get back on.

14

we'll be on the record, but you all are welcome to leave and

15

talk.

16

MR. HALE:

17

(Pause in proceedings).

18

THE COURT:

So

Thank you.

We're still on the record.

I took the

19

opportunity to get some coffee while you were guys were

20

caucusing.

21

where are we after you've had a chance to talk to everybody?

22

So thank you very much for that opportunity.

MR. HALE:

Defense counsel's conferred and would

23

consent to the stipulation of amending the complaint and

24

filing the amended complaint.

25

THE COURT:

So

Okay.
14

1
2

MR. WISSBROECKER:
brief as I can.

Your Honor, I'll try to be as

I don't want to drag this on.

3

THE COURT:

Certainly.

4

MR. WISSBROECKER:

Plaintiff's position is this: is

5

that if the Court wants to go forward with hearing the Motion

6

to Dismiss, we believe that we should have the opportunity to

7

argue briefly.

8

an overly long argument, but, you know, if the Court is

9

inclined to grant the motion and determine the case is direct

It's a legal issue.

I don't think that it's

10

~ or derivative as opposed to direct, we'd like the

11

opportunity to present argument to the Court on that issue

12

before the Court makes that determination.

13

THE COURT:

Going down the -

I apologize for interrupting.

Do you

14

not simply want to file your amended complaint to which the

15

defendants have agreed?

16

MR. WISSBROECKER:

We - well, in the event the

17

Court grants the Motion to Dismiss, we would ask, you know,

18

that it be without prejudice, and that we'd be allowed the

19

opportunity to file the complaint which would be a derivative

20

complaint.

21

stipulate to the filing of that complaint.

22

And we understand the defendants are ready to

We would also, however, ask the Court for an

23

opportunity to not file the one that we submitted to the

24

Court in connection with our preliminary injunction briefing.

25

We would ask the Court for the opportunity to take a week,
15

1

maybe, you know, Monday even, a few days to be able to amend

2

that because of the new information that has been disclosed

3

to the Court by defendants regarding the information that the

4

company does have about the merger, that they did not

5

disclose to shareholders including, you know, some of the

6

negotiations, the value of the - the issues I identified

7

earlier, the networking capital and those issues.

8

We think that we should have the opportunity to add

9

that, because - and the Court is spot on in understanding the

10

issue of irreparable harm and how it's kind of circular.

And

11

we, you know, we tried to explain that to the Court in our

12

papers too.

13

Court will eventually hear the Motion to Dismiss the

14

derivative complaint, this Court acknowledges the issue is

15

going to be irreparable harm, whether or not that is a

16

permissible - is permissible for us to file a complaint.

And if the Court is going to eventually, and the

17

Now, we've given the Court the law on the issue of

18

irreparable harm, and we think in the context of at least as

19

far as the alleged non-disclosures go and the breach of the

20

duty of disclosure, the issue is whether or not the

21

information is material that wasn't disclosed.

22

material, then the case law says irreparable harm exists, per

23

se.

24
25

THE COURT: Well, but wait.

If it is

But before we start to

argue that issue —
16

1

MR. WISSBROECKER: Sure.

Yeah.

I sorry.

2

THE COURT:

3

want to file the amended complaint?

4

told you what I thought about the Motion to Dismiss, and

5

that's without argument certainly, and you're welcome to

6

argue that if you don't want to stipulate to the filing of

7

the amended complaint.

8

want to file the amended complaint, I'm not sure why we need

9

to hear the Motion to Dismiss.

10

I'm still not quite understanding.

Do you not

I mean, I guess, I've

But - does that make sense?

If you

MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, you know, as we tried to

11

make clear in our papers, is that wanting to file the amended

12

complaint would fall on the heels of the Court granting - in

13

the event that the Court determined that our claims should

14

have been brought direct.

15

know, as a proposed amendment and went through and did the

16

analysis about why we think that that complaint would satisfy

17

the requirements for the filing of the derivative lawsuit.

18

THE COURT:

19

I'll rule right now.

20

And that's why we offered, you

If you want to waive oral argument,

MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, I would appreciate the

21

opportunity to explain quickly why we think that the claims

22

are derived, but if the Court is telling us that there's no

23

way you're going to change your mind, then —

24

THE COURT:

25 J never do that.

I'm not telling you that.

I would

But let me hear - I think Mr. Hale has been
17

1

standing up a couple of times.

2

MR. HALE:

I'm sorry.

I just want to say that if

3

he wants to go forward with the Motion to Dismiss, we have

4

tried to expedite this process by stipulating to it.

5

wants to go forward with arguing the Motion to Dismiss, we

6

withdraw our stipulation, and we'll just go through the

7

normal course of litigation and file your Motion for Leave to

8

Amend if you grant the motion, and we'll deal with it that

9

way.

If he

What we're trying to do is short circuit all that,

10

which accommodates him, which he's asked to have all us

11

accommodate his schedule over the last three weeks.

12

we're trying to do it again and he's not accepted the offer,

13

and we'll withdraw it.

14

We'll just deal with the fallout from that.

And

We can argue the Motion to Dismiss.

15

THE COURT: Mr. Gross?

16

MR. GROSS:

Can I make one observation?

We, I

17

think, wasted a lot of the Court's time, a lot of the

18

resources of the parties gearing this up.

19

heard was, let's argue a motion which we don't really need to

20

argue because he wants to file an amended complaint.

21

it ought to be one or the other.

22

tee this up, have oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and

23

it's granted, it ought to be with prejudice.

24

hand, if he wants to have another operative complaint that is

25

going to be the subject of this litigation, then we ought to

And what I just

I think

If he wants to go ahead and

On the other

18

1

get it on file.

But I think enough time has been wasted on

2

matters to date.

And I think it's - we'd just be doing it

3

again, arguing this Motion to Dismiss, if all they want to do

4

is file an amended complaint.

5

THE COURT:

What do you want to do?

6

MR. WISSBROECKER:

Well, I think I'm intelligent

7

enough to see that the tide is rolling against me on this

8

issue.

9

amended complaint.

So we would - we'll enter the stipulation to file an
We just request some additional time to

10

amend that further and present the Court with an amended

11

derivative complaint.

12

seven days, but we can do it on short time frame,

And we can do that - we would ask for

13

Here's the issue, is that if the Court is not going

14

- if we're not going to be able to get access to the evidence

15

which we believe is necessary to support the motion for a

16

preliminary injunction, then to a certain extent, the

17

exigencies associated with briefing the Motion to Dismiss are

18

not as present as they were before because the tender offer

19

is going to close, in theory, as long as it's not extended on

20

Friday.

21

not as tight a schedule, then we'd just ask for a few days to

22

submit to the Court with another amended complaint.

23

So we think that given the fact that the timing is

THE COURT:

Well, and as I said earlier, I think

24

that - and I think that the issue of expedited discovery in

25

my mind goes along with a complaint that will survive a
19

1

Motion to Dismiss.

2

will.ing to order expedited di scovery at this time, because at

3

this po int I don't know if we have a complaint that will

4

survive a Motion to Dismiss.

5

So -- and that's the reason that I'm not

That's just my explanation, for the benefit of all

6

of you.

7

counsel, plaintiff may file an amended complaint as a

8

derivative action.

9

reserving in the right of defendants, however, their right to

But here's what I will do, based upon stipulation of

He may have a week within which to do so

10

further object because they looked at the proposed complaint

11

that was on file.

12

Motion to File an Amended complaint without everybody having

13

had a chance to look at the proposed amended complaint.

14

I understand that.

15

opportunity to kind of refine their amended complaint, and it

16

will be filed.

17

that - any causes of action or otherwise that are in there

18

that they didn't have an opportunity to do before, I'll give

19

them that opportunity.

And in fairness, I shouldn't be granting a

And

So, I'm going to give plaintiff an

But if any counsel wishes to address anything

20

Okay.

21

MR. HALE:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HALE:

Does that make sense?

Mr. Hale?
One other housekeeping —
Of course.
— matter and that is, they filed a

24

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

25

forward -

We are ready to come

20

1

THE COURT: That's right.

2

MR. HALE: - today and put on rebuttal evidence.

3 ! And they - so it seems to me, either they ought to withdraw
4

the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or you ought to deny

5

it, one or the other.
THE COURT:

6

And I will say - well, I'll let

7

plaintiff respond, but my understanding was they were

8

withdrawing it before we got to court today but I could be

9

wrong.
MR. WISSBROECKER:

10

Well, we were hopeful that the

11

Court was going to give us, you know, that we were going to

12

get access to the discovery.

13

going to happen now.

14

the preliminary injunction motion.
THE COURT:

15

It's clear that that's not

So, you know, we will agree to withdraw

Okay, thank you.

16

need to take care of this morning?

17

patience in dealing with my schedule.

18

an order?

Anything else that we

Thank you all for your
Who wants to prepare

Plaintiff want to do that?

19

MR. WISSBROECKER:

Sure.

20

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

21

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Okay.

22
23
24
25
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16-10a-1328. Procedure for shareholder dissatisfied with
payment or offer.
(1) A dissenter who has not accepted an offer made by a
corporation under Section 16-10a-1327 may notify the corporation
in writing of his own estimate of the fair value of his shares and
demand payment of the estimated amount, plus interest, less any
payment made under Section 16-10a-1325, if:
(a) the dissenter believes that the amount paid under
Section 16-10a-1325 or offered under Section 16-10a-1327
is less than the fair value of the shares;
(b) the corporation fails to make payment under
Section 16-10a-1325 within 60 days after the date set by the
corporation as the date by which it must receive the payment
demand; or
(c) the corporation, having failed to take the proposed
corporate action creating dissenters' rights, does not return
the deposited certificates or release the transfer restrictions
imposed on uncertificated shares as required by
Section 16-10a-1326.
(2) A dissenter waives the right to demand payment under this
section unless he causes the corporation to receive the notice
required by Subsection (1) within 30 days after the corporation
made or offered payment for his shares.
1992

